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Title: Fake News: Is Truth Really Under Attack? 
 
Global discourse bemoaning the subversion of truth may be reinforcing falsity on what 
the truth is.  The history of Western philosophy’s approaches to epistemology can 
illustrate this. 
Epistemology is often defined as the study of how we know what we know.  It usually 
subsumes arriving at what we know through a belief we believe is true and we can 
justify as true.  Those who develop and implement disinformation and deception 
operations against us target how and what we justify as true—justification being 
something we perform both consciously and out of awareness. 
Global discourse bemoaning the subversion of truth is founded on the presumption that 
there are agreed-upon justifications for what we should know.  Not ‘should’ in the sense 
of morally right or wrong but of being the case or not.  However, the history of Western 
epistemology suggests otherwise. 
In correspondence approaches to knowledge, we assume we can come up with 
something inside us—usually called the ‘mind’—that is exactly the case for something 
outside of us.  We then believe we know this.  Illusions, delusions, and hallucinations 
suggest that we may not know what we think we know inside or out.   
In coherence approaches to knowledge, we believe we know something when it fits into 
what else we know.  But anomalies violating scientific theories and information 
supporting everyday theories that are later violated—e. g., a loyal spouse becoming 
disloyal—suggest coherence might be incoherent. 
In pragmatic approaches to knowledge, we believe we know something when our world 
changes in a manner we believe must follow from some characteristic of that 
something.  But some days the snack dispenser doesn’t work and after many 
confirmations of food and safety the turkey becomes Thanksgiving dinner. 
Epistemology contains further complexities.  Sometimes we believe we know what 
things mean even if they don’t seem to refer to anything at all in the world.  As Sir 
Bertrand Russell has shown us, we know what ‘the present King of France is bald’ 
means, even if there isn’t one.  Moreover, we seem to live within epistemological 
hierarchies—a combination of criteria we use to come to believe we know something.  
These hierarchies usually include belief in knowledge through just believing in it (faith), 
through some higher authority (secular or sacred), through intuition, through our senses, 
and through systematic sensing via experiments that seem to replicate or falsify what 
we believe we know.  In addition, our approaches to knowledge seem to change in 
different situations, different stages of our lives, and for humanity different historical 
eras. 
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Western epistemology doesn’t demand skepticism, i. e., that we can’t know anything—
even if it has been attributed to Gorgias the Skeptic that nothing exists; if it does, we 
can’t know it; and if we can know it, it can’t be communicated.  It does strongly suggest 
we should not believe that we know that some incontrovertible truth is under attack.  
Instead, the truth is up for grabs, always has been, always will.  Yes, some truths are 
easier to arrive at, and we may choose to believe what we don’t know or can’t justify 
knowing.  In fact, being a free and decent person may denote standing up not fore [sic] 
what works, but for what’s right.  Fake news is just rhetoric linked to the epistemological 
challenge of the human condition. 
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Abstract/Description:  Attacking fake news may be as fake as fake news. Or so 
suggests Western epistemology. 
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